Agenda

Issues for discussion with the DCI in the order in which they are to be discussed:

(Aluo) I. Use of the Polygraph as a Clearance Requirement

(Muo)III. Creation of a National Intelligence Operations Center

(uc) IV. Personnel Evaluation

(Anuo) V. Position Classification Authority

(uc) VI. Personnel Management

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I. Use of Polygraph as a Clearance Requirement

1) Issue - All federal government and military services within the U. S. use E.O. 10450 and DCID 1/14 as the basic criteria upon which individuals are granted access to classified information, with E.O. 10450 setting forth the requirements for Confidential, Secret and Top Secret access and DCID 1/14 the criteria for access to Special Compartmental Information.

While there is unanimity in the acceptance of these guidelines, there is no standard throughout government with regard to using the polygraph as part of the clearance procedure. To be specific, the CIA and NSA are the only two agencies which use the polygraph in this manner, and even within the two agencies the extent of such use varies.

If one accepts the polygraph as a valid and valuable tool in determining one's suitability for access to classified information, then there should be a definite requirement that any U.S. citizen who will be given access to a given level of classified information must be subjected to a polygraph every five years.

As it now stands, the CIA attempts to polygraph all staff employees, as well as any other individual given unescorted access to Agency facilities. Only recently the CIA began a program to polygraph selected contractor's employees. NSA, on the other hand, polygraphes all of their civilian and contractors' employees, but does not polygraph the military personnel assigned to NSA.

Since the purpose of the clearance process would seem to be the prevention of a Boyce/Lee or Edwin Moore case, it seems somewhat inconsistent that a multitude of military and civilian employees of the federal government are granted access to the same classified information, despite the fact that not all of these individuals have undergone the same scrutiny from a security standpoint.

2) Recommendation - The DCI, as head of the Intelligence Community and Chairman of the NRO, should institute a policy which requires that one undergo a polygraph examination on a five year cycle as part of routine security

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clearance processing for access to "Secret/Top Secret" and/or "Compartmented Information." This should include the following, in addition to those now being polygraphed, who will have such access:

- a) Staff employees of Congressional What exclured representatives
- b) Federal Bureau of Investigation employees
- c) Departments of State, Justice, etc.
- d) White House staff
- e) Contractors' employees

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III. A National Intelligence Operations Center

1) Background - An Intelligence Community Staff study is currently being conducted to establish a National Intelligence Tasking Center (NITC) to centralize the various human and technical collection assets dispursed throughout the Community into a more manageable, responsive mechanism for your control as DCI.

Recommendation - Consider the creation of a National Intelligence Operations Center contiguous to a National Intelligence TAsking Center to bridge the gap between responsive collection and exploitation and National-level analysis and production.

It would seem that much emphasis is being placed on tasking collection resources on a national level with a resultant lack of national-level analysis and production. It is important to have a functioning national-level analytical Center working day-to-day problems. This becomes particularly important during more for charles a crisis situation.

Personnel Evaluation

Issue - Supervisors do not apply uniform standards in employee evaluations.

Performance evaluations, despite the use of standardized forms, are not well written. The narrative section will discuss such things as appearance, attitude, aggressiveness. Long narratives will focus on a description of the job instead of discussing the strengths and weaknesses of the employee. If you do not happen to have a good writer as your supervisor, you are penalized for the brevity of the narrative or the lack of specific performance description. Frequently, supervisors use the language of past fitness reports and merely comment on issues raised in the past which have nothing to do with present performance.

Recommendation - Compulsory attendance for all supervisors but expecially new supervisors at such courses as Performance Evaluation Workshop, Fundamentals of Supervision and Management or Supervisory Skills and denial of an employee's personnel file for use in writing a current fitness report.

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A recent review of selected occupational series in CIA, in response to OMB Bulletin No. 77-11, 28 June 1977, subject: Controlling Grade Escalation in the General Schedule, revealed that the average grade for most series' studied was higher than the government-wide average grade for comparable series'. Taking into consideration the very real differences of mission, employee mix, and in some cases function, the study showed that some of the occupations in CIA should be reviewed very carefully as targets for average grade reduction.

The principle of equal pay for equal work in CIA, whether internal or external comparisons are used, has been eroded in some instances. Part of the reason for this is the lack of defined classification authority.

Recommendations

- a) That the Director of Personnel, through PMCD, exercise the authority to reclassify positions at the time they are reviewed, if they are found to be overgraded or undergraded.
- b) That a clearly defined appeals channel be developed through which the manager can go if he disagrees with classification decisions implemented by the Director of Personnel.

VI. Personnel Management

1) <u>Issue</u> - Should Career Evaluation Panels use position headroom (slots) to determine promotions or overall Directorate headroom as the DDO does?

The use of overall Directorate headroom allows a panel to reward an employee based on performance regardless of slot. He is competitive with all others of that grade and not locked in. However, the categories of the employees may not always be reasonables such as a specialists grouping where you are comparing small numbers of unrelated specialists based on fitness reports.

Promotions within slots follow Civil Service Commission guidelines which state if you are doing a job whose level of difficulty warrants a specific grade, then you should be eligible for that grade. If you are alot bound and outstanding then you should be given a different position which allows headroom or the position should be reclassified if the duties have expanded. However, this can lead to slot manipulation by managers with employees resloted at whim to meet a certain situation.

2) Recommendation - Study the two issues carefully before putting ghe Agency under one system. Some positions may lend themselves to overall headroom and others may not. Don't lock Directorates into one or the other.